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Influenza Mandates and  
Religious Accommodation: 
Avoiding Legal Pitfalls
Dorit Rubinstein Reiss and V.B. Dubal
High vaccination rates of health care work-ers (“HCW”) confer important benefits in harms prevented and costs saved.1 How-
ever, employers requiring annual influenza vaccines 
need to consider federal (and state) laws that protect 
employees from religious discrimination. In the past 
few years, several lawsuits addressing religious dis-
crimination have been filed against employers impos-
ing a mandate. The policies challenged in these cases, 
and anecdotal discussion with practitioners, suggest 
there is some confusion about the state of the law. 
This article first examines how federal law that pro-
tects against religious discrimination in the workplace 
interacts with influenza mandates. It then goes on to 
discuss what recent lawsuits teach us about religious 
exemptions to these mandates. We emphasize that 
in the case of influenza vaccines, employers may not 
be required to offer a religious exemption. In fact, 
we argue that offering such an accommodation may 
increase the health care institution’s risk of liability. 
We do not review litigation around collective bar-
gaining agreements and the division of roles between 
employers and employees, which deserve their own 
treatment.2
The Justification for Workplace Influenza 
Mandates:
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Advi-
sory Committee on Immunization Practices recom-
mends that healthcare workers be vaccinated against 
influenza both for their own protection and that of 
vulnerable patients.3 Indeed, a recent review pointed 
to direct evidence that healthcare workers trans-
mit influenza to patients and that the vaccination of 
healthcare workers against influenza decreases mor-
tality. The review suggested it may also confer other 
benefits in reducing illness.4 A vaccination require-
ment by employers is thus an effective way to prevent 
death and illness. Studies confirm that employers who 
require that healthcare workers (“HCW”) receive an 
annual influenza vaccine achieve dramatically higher 
rates of coverage than employers who do not.5 Other 
methods of increasing coverage — improving edu-
cation, making the vaccines easily accessible — are 
helpful, but to a much lesser degree.6 Empirical evi-
dence suggests that influenza vaccination rates among 
health care institutions (hospitals, hospices, nurs-
ing home, and other similar facilities) that require 
healthcare workers be vaccinated have compliance 
rates above 90%, while health care institutions with-
out such requirements have rates as low as 44.9%. A 
review of the literature by Wang et. al. confirms that 
“only an institutional mandate for influenza vaccina-
tion proved to achieve the … objective of vaccinating 
90% of H[ealth] C[are] P[roviders].”7 
For these reasons, multiple medical organiza-
tions, including the American Academy of Family 
Physicians, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the 
American Hospital Association, the American Medi-
cal Directors Association, the American Pharmacists 
Association, and many others, support mandatory 
influenza vaccination for HCWs.8 To complement this 
empirical reality, scholars have also argued that health 
care institutions are ethically obligated to mandate 
influenza vaccination of their staff.9 
Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, LL.B., Ph.D., is a Professor of Law 
at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law 
who specializes in law and policy related to vaccines. V.B. 
Dubal, J.D., Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of Law at the 
University of California, Hastings College of the Law who spe-
cializes in employment law and employment discrimination, 
and researches the intersection of work law and social change. 
Reiss and Dubal
the medicalization of poverty • fall 2018 757
The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 46 (2018): 756-762. © 2018 The Author(s)
The Legal Framework
Employers have broad power to institute workplace 
health and safety regulations, and employees cannot 
unilaterally reject workplace requirements absent a 
protective statute or judicial doctrine. What specific 
federal law should hospital employers be concerned 
about when considering vaccination mandates? 
The most important set of laws governing the scope 
of workplaces rules and regulations are anti-discrim-
ination statutes. The cases we review below allege 
religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which applies directly to private 
employers and, with important limits, requires that 
employers provide religious accommodations. 
Constitutional law also provides religious protec-
tions, but for two significant reasons, cases challeng-
ing vaccination mandates are much more likely to 
arise under Title VII than under the First Amend-
ment’s free exercise clause. The First Amendment only 
applies to state actors, and, therefore, does not cover 
private employers (like most health care institutions). 
Second, federal jurisprudence limits the application 
of the First Amendment to laws (and by implication, 
policies) that are facially neutral — meaning laws that 
do not explicitly discriminate against any particu-
lar minority group.10 Vaccine mandates are facially 
neutral; they are not aimed at a religious group, and 
hence, can withstand that test. Thus, a claim against 
an employer alleging a First Amendment violation for 
failure to provide a religious exemption to a vaccine 
mandate is likely to fail. Also, the litigation history of 
cases challenging school immunization requirements 
suggests that if allegations that mandates violate the 
First Amendment arise, then they will be unsuccess-
ful.11 State level constitutional and statutory require-
ments, like a Religion Freedom Restoration Act, may 
also exist, but our focus here is on federal law appli-
cable to all health care institutions. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act forbids employ-
ers from discriminating against employees based 
on, among other things, their religion. This prohibi-
tion requires that an employer provide “reasonable 
accommodation” when a work requirement or prac-
tice violates an employee’s sincere religious beliefs. 
Two threshold questions arise in relation to accom-
modations to influenza mandates: First, what makes 
a vaccination accommodation “reasonable” under a 
Title VII? Second, what constitutes a sincere religious 
belief? 
Reasonable Accommodation
To be reasonable, an accommodation need not be the 
one preferred by the employee. In fact, the case law 
suggests that if the accommodation imposes more 
than minimal costs to the employer, the employer 
does not have to provide it.12 As we address separately 
below, given the high burdens of influenza vaccine 
accommodations, health care institutions may not be 
required to provide a religious exemp-
tion at all. To date, no good, viable sub-
stitute for influenza vaccination prevents 
transmission of the flu. Masks, the most 
commonly utilized alternative, have sub-
stantial problems. Evidence suggests 
that mask compliance is limited and that 
its effectiveness in preventing transmis-
sion is mixed.13 Enforcing a continuous 
requirement like masks is clearly more 
onerous and less effective compared to 
a one-time vaccination. The potential 
costs of preventable influenza cases include missed 
workdays and sick or dead patients — both significant 
burdens for hospital employers.14
Sincere Belief
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) — the government agency tasked with enforc-
ing Title VII — defines religion as “moral or ethical 
beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sin-
cerely held with the strength of traditional religious 
views.”15 The jurisprudence suggests that religious pro-
tection under Title VII is much broader than merely a 
belief in God. A recent case suggests, for example, that 
it could be interpreted to include a vegan worldview.16 
However, protection from religious discrimination is 
not unlimited, as discussed in the next sections. To jus-
tify an accommodation, the belief must be “sincerely 
held.”17 In making this evaluation, a hospital employer 
may consider factors that undermine the sincerity 
of the employee’s religious beliefs, such as an earlier 
request with a secular reason or behavior inconsistent 
with regard to the belief.18 
While the EEOC’s interpretation is not authoritative 
— courts have and do independently interpret Title 
VII — its definition is important in two ways. First, 
the EEOC uses this definition in deciding whether to 
Two threshold questions arise in 
relation to accommodations to influenza 
mandates: First, what makes a vaccination 
accommodation “reasonable” under a Title 
VII? Second, what constitutes a sincere 
religious belief? 
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sue employers. Because the EEOC is a repeat player 
with decades of experience interpreting federal anti-
discrimination laws, the lawsuits brought by the 
agency may be a warning sign to health care institu-
tions that there is a real problem. Second, courts may 
accord deference to reasonable agency interpretations 
of their own statutes.19 
Is a Religious Exemption Desirable or Necessary? 
Since the risk of litigation also exists with a reli-
gious exemption in place — and, as we describe, may 
increase if the religious exemption does not meet legal 
requirements — health care institutions should seri-
ously consider whether it is desirable or necessary 
to offer a religious exemption at all. Title VII applies 
whether or not the hospital has an official religious 
exemption. An employee may request accommoda-
tion even without formal exemptions, and the hospital 
will need to consider what is required under federal 
law. Offering a formal religious accommodation can 
have the advantage of institutionalizing procedures 
and guidance. On the other hand, creating an official 
exemption can be seen as embracing or legitimizing 
refusal. Importantly, it may also increase the visibil-
ity of refusal and lead to more exemption requests, 
including by employees who may otherwise not ask for 
them. Policies can be put in place to address a request 
for accommodation without creating a formal exemp-
tion. The question then becomes whether or not the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires accommodating an 
employee who states a religious opposition to influ-
enza vaccines — or whether an accommodation is oth-
erwise desirable or necessary.
During the 2009 H1N1 epidemic, the EEOC issued 
guidelines regarding influenza mandates in the work-
place that may be interpreted to require a religious 
exemption.20 Specifically, the guidelines stated that 
…under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, once an employer receives notice that 
an employee’s sincerely held religious belief, 
practice, or observance prevents him from taking 
the influenza vaccine, the employer must provide 
a reasonable accommodation unless it would 
pose an undue hardship as defined by Title VII 
(‘more than de minimis cost’ to the operation 
of the employer’s business, which is a lower 
standard than under the ADA).21 (our italics)
This language, however, does not mean that the EEOC 
interprets the law to require a religious exemption. 
The document reiterates that an exemption is only 
required if it is not an “undue hardship.” The bar for 
what constitutes an undue hardship is low. Our read-
ing is that employers have a strong case that the risks 
posed by influenza transmission from an unvacci-
nated hospital employee constitute more than a de 
minimis burden. As we discuss above, masks are not 
an effective precaution as a substitute, given the mixed 
evidence on their effectiveness and the difficulty to 
enforce constant wearing.22 Reassigning an employee 
is an option, but is not always feasible. A hospital that 
concludes that a religious exemption imposes a real 
burden can likely justify not providing one, though it 
would still have to consider such requests to comply 
with Title VII. 
Religious freedom is important in the United States, 
among other things because of historical discrimina-
tion against religious groups.23 However, Title VII has 
never required unlimited and unrestricted accommo-
dation of religious beliefs because other interests also 
matter. In the health care institution context, a HCW’s 
desire not to vaccinate against influenza increases 
the risk of influenza transmitted to fellow employees 
and patients. This great risk — in a profession that is 
already highly regulated — is why ethics scholars sup-
port mandates.24 The risk to life is not eliminated or 
curtailed because the employee’s reason not to vac-
cinate is religious. Even when weighed against the 
iniquities of religious discrimination, the burden on 
the hospital — and its patients — likely constitutes an 
undue hardship. 
Despite a strong legal argument that health care 
institutions need not provide religious accommoda-
tions in this context, we found that ironically, all the 
health care institutions that faced Title VII litigation 
challenges did, in fact, provide a religious exemption. 
In some contexts, public (though not private) health 
care institutions may see no other choice. Religious 
Freedom Restoration Acts in some states require an 
exemption.25 In the cases we review, however, the 
health care institutions seemed to act out of respect 
for religious values, or a belief — supported by some 
— that an exemption is required.26 HCW complaints 
focused on the application of these accommodations, 
not on the lack of one. We examine these cases as cau-
tionary tales for health care employers.
Implementing an Existing Religious 
Exemption: Pitfalls and Solutions
In 2016, the EEOC has sued three health care insti-
tutions for alleged religious discrimination regarding 
religious exemptions for influenza mandates. Two of 
these cases settled, and one remains open.27 Two other 
cases brought by individual employees were decided 
against the employees.28 In 2018 the EEOC brought 
another case against a hospital, and referred one 
more to the Department of Justice, which brought 
Reiss and Dubal
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suit against the hospital.29 The recent involvement of 
the EEOC, in particular, helps shed light on how the 
regulatory agency thinks about Title VII liability as it 
relates to exemptions. Together, these recent lawsuits 
provide four key lessons in Title VII compliance for 
employers.30
What is a Sincere Religious Belief?
The first lesson is that health care institutions may 
be held liable for their evaluation of what constitutes 
a “sincere religious belief.”31 A recent consent decree 
between the Saint Vincent Hospital in Eerie, Pennsyl-
vania and the EEOC, underscored that an employer 
cannot limit religious exemptions to people belonging 
to an organized religion that prohibits vaccines.32 Sim-
ilarly, in EEOC v. Ozaukee County, a nursing home was 
sued because a requirement for an exemption was a 
letter from a clergy person. Because the HCW did not 
belong to an organized religion and could not get such 
a letter, she was denied the exemption.33 Such limita-
tions discriminate against people who are not part of 
an organized religion but who hold sincere religious 
beliefs against vaccines. 
We agree that providing equal treatment to people 
with similarly sincere beliefs, whether or not their 
beliefs find their roots in an organized religion, is 
appropriate, and that any other approach would 
be discriminatory. But we also understand why 
health care institutions would be inclined to use this 
approach, which gives them an objective tool to assess 
“sincerity” that is easier to use than an examination 
of an employee’s heart and mind. Nevertheless, this 
approach is clearly impermissible.34 
A reasonable alternative may be to ask an employee 
requesting an exemption to write out and explain the 
beliefs behind the refusal (as suggested in Opel35). This 
approach has three important advantages. It allows the 
hospital to examine the sincerity of the religious belief 
while avoiding the pitfall of discriminating between 
organized religions and other sincere religious beliefs. 
It also reduces the risk of illegally judging the relative 
merit of a religious belief.36 Notably, litigation from 
the school exemptions context teaches us that a mem-
ber of a religion that supports vaccines — like Catholi-
cism or Judaism — may still claim exemption based 
on personal religious beliefs against vaccines.37 This 
approach helps to address these potential variations 
and sources of sincerely held religious beliefs.38 
Of course, not every belief qualifies as religious. 
In Fallon v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center39 the 3rd 
Circuit examined the limits of what constitutes “reli-
gious,” and suggested a clear and useful test. The 
three-part test adopted by the 3rd circuit (drawing on 
Africa v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania40) included 
the following inquiries: (1) does the religion address 
fundamental and ultimate questions, (2) is it a com-
prehensive belief system, and (3) is it more than an 
isolated teaching, as often recognized by formal and 
external signs.41
The 3rd circuit concluded that the plaintiff, Mr. Fal-
lon, failed this test because his beliefs did not address 
fundamental matters, but rather were based on disbe-
lief of the scientific consensus that the vaccine is safe. 
The court wrote, “the basis of his refusal of the flu vac-
cine — his concern that the flu vaccine may do more 
harm than good — is a medical belief, not a religious 
one.” The decision also pointed out that the one moral 
commandment Mr. Fallon relied on—that he should 
not do harm to his body — was “an “isolated moral 
teaching”; by itself, this belief was not a comprehen-
sive system of beliefs about fundamental or ultimate 
matters.”42 
The first lesson is that health care institutions may be held liable for their 
evaluation of what constitutes a “sincere religious belief.” A recent consent 
decree between the Saint Vincent Hospital in Eerie, Pennsylvania and the 
EEOC, underscored that an employer cannot limit religious exemptions to 
people belonging to an organized religion that prohibits vaccines. Similarly, 
in EEOC v. Ozaukee County, a nursing home was sued because a requirement 
for an exemption was a letter from a clergy person. Because the HCW did not 
belong to an organized religion and could not get such a letter, she was denied 
the exemption. Such limitations discriminate against people who are not part 
of an organized religion but who hold sincere religious beliefs against vaccines. 
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When is a Religious Accomodation “Reasonable”?
A second lesson gleaned from recent cases is that if 
a hospital provides religious accommodations, it may 
face litigation over what is “reasonable.” In Robinson 
v. Children’s Hospital Boston, a HCW claimed that 
her religion opposed vaccines and asked for an accom-
modation. The hospital attempted to locate a position 
outside of patient areas for the HCW. When no such 
position was found, the employer treated her termina-
tion as a resignation, which allowed her to apply to 
open positions in the future. After costly litigation, 
the federal district court ruled for the hospital, find-
ing that the employer had gone above and beyond its 
duty under Title VII. Robinson thus also suggests that 
efforts to reassign an employee to another position can 
be a reasonable accommodation, even if such efforts 
are not successful. 
When is Disparate Treatment a Problem?
Note that health care institutions may face litigation 
even when policies, on their face, appear reasonable, 
especially if there is any disparate treatment between 
employees seeking an exemption and those not treat-
ing an exemption. In EEOC v. Mission Hospital, for 
example, the EEOC claimed that the hospital’s Sep-
tember 1st deadline to request an exemption from an 
influenza vaccine mandate was unreasonable, even 
though the deadline corresponded with flu season. 
The court denied summary judgment, and the parties 
settled, with the hospital compensating the employ-
ees — though not reinstating them — and agreeing 
to offer employees seeking a medical and religious 
exemption the same grace period that it offered all 
other employees. It also promised to inform employ-
ees more clearly of the influenza mandate policy, 
including exemptions.43 
Ultimately, the core issue in Mission Hospital 
was the differential treatment of employees seek-
ing exemption from the mandate and employees not 
seeking an exemption. Employees who intended to 
get vaccinated, but who missed the deadline, were 
offered a grace period to comply.44 Those who missed 
the deadline and intended to request an 
exemption, were not offered the same 
grace period. The EEOC used this treat-
ment as a yardstick by which to evaluate 
whether there was underlying religious 
discrimination. 
In Memorial Hospital, a similar case 
involving disparate treatment — the 
latest to date — the EEOC brought suit 
against a hospital in Michigan which 
rescinded an employment offer to a 
medical transcriptionist who claimed 
religious opposition to influenza vac-
cines.45 The basis of the claim was that 
the prospective employee offered to wear 
a mask during influenza season. While 
the hospital refused her accommodation, 
it did allow other employees with medi-
cal problems to wear a mask. 
Thus, a third lesson is that different 
treatment of employees requesting reli-
gious exemptions compared to employees seeking 
medical exemptions or unexempt employees may trig-
ger EEOC scrutiny. That does not mean employers can-
not make distinctions. It just means that health care 
institutions need to be mindful and make sure distinc-
tions can be well justified. At least two justifications 
may support, for example, distinguishing between 
employees seeking religious exemptions and those 
seeking medical exemptions. First, legally, the frame-
work for seeking medical and religious exemptions 
is different — while the standard for undue burden 
under Title VII is very low, as described, the standard 
for refusing exemptions under the Americans With 
Disabilities Act, which would govern medical exemp-
tions, is much higher.46 On the merits, too, employers 
may justifiably see medical exemptions as less poten-
tially common than religious ones. The acknowledged 
medical barriers to receiving flu vaccines are very few, 
and the number of healthcare workers in that cat-
egory should be minute, but any number may claim 
a religious exemption. Health care institutions need 
to be aware, however, that disparate treatment among 
employees can lead to closer scrutiny from the EEOC 
and potentially increase the chances of litigation. 
Our review of recent lawsuits suggests 
important lessons for how health care 
institutions can properly administer religious 
exemptions and avoid some of the mistakes 
associated with litigation. Based on our 
review, we also maintain that any religious 
exemptions to flu mandates granted a 
HCW with patient contact may, one, pose 
an unreasonable burden to the healthcare 
facility and thus not be required under 
federal laws, and two, open the employer up 
to additional legal scrutiny.  
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What about HCWs without Patient Interaction?
Finally, a fourth important lesson from recent liti-
gation is that health care institutions should care-
fully evaluate the benefits of vaccine or masking 
requirements for employees who do not interact with 
patients, and consider whether a requirement that 
these employees vaccinate or mask is appropriate. For 
such employees, accommodation may be considered a 
de minimis burden, since the risk of harm is relatively 
remote. In an open case, EEOC v. Baystate, a HCW 
with religious objections to vaccines was terminated 
after she did not wear the required mask during work 
hours. She then sued. The EEOC’s complaint on her 
behalf emphasized that the employee was not work-
ing in areas in which she had contact with patients. 
We do not know how the court will rule, but health 
care institutions should consider whether a masking 
requirement (or even a vaccination requirement) for 
employees who do not interact with patients can be 
justified, substantively and legally. 
Conclusion
Reducing influenza in healthcare facilities is an impor-
tant public health goal. Workplace mandates are an 
effective tool to achieve this, and being mindful of the 
law can make implementing these requirements eas-
ier and more effective. While hospital employers can 
never completely insulate themselves from legal chal-
lenges associated with such mandates, understanding 
the contours of recent lawsuits can reduce the risk of 
litigation and increase the chances of defeating any 
claims that are brought. Our review of recent law-
suits suggests important lessons for how health care 
institutions can properly administer religious exemp-
tions and avoid some of the mistakes associated with 
litigation. Based on our review, we also maintain that 
any religious exemptions to flu mandates granted a 
HCW with patient contact may, one, pose an unrea-
sonable burden to the healthcare facility and thus 
not be required under federal laws, and two, open the 
employer up to additional legal scrutiny.47
Note 
Dorit Reiss owns regular stock in GSK. 
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